The DST Task Force on Implementation of a Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India lays out a phased migration with two adopter tracks and three milestones. KavachQ implements it end-to-end.
The Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) strategy deployed by global adversaries has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity risk horizon. Data encrypted today with classical algorithms (RSA, ECC) is already vulnerable to retroactive decryption by future quantum computers.
Recognising this threat, the National Quantum Mission (NQM) has released a strategic roadmap defining a rigid timeline for India's transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), treating it as a non-negotiable aspect of national security and economic resilience.
Organisations that begin now will complete migration within normal planning and budget cycles. Those that delay will face compressed timelines, higher costs, and potential compliance violations.
The Task Force frames the threat as two parallel attack patterns: HNDL — Harvest Now, Decrypt Later, where adversaries store today's encrypted traffic for future quantum decryption — and TNFL — Trust Now, Forge Later, where signatures issued today are forged after Q-Day arrives.
The DST report cites the IonQ CEO at the World Economic Forum (Davos, January 2026) warning that Q-Day — when quantum computers break widely used public-key cryptography — may arrive within three years.
The DST report cites a Bain & Company assessment: 70% of executives expect quantum-enabled cyberattacks within five years; nearly a third expect them within three. Most organisations have no plan in place.
Coined by Michele Mosca, this is the standard heuristic for quantum-readiness planning: how long must your data stay secret (X), how long will migration take you (Y), and when will a CRQC arrive (Z)?
How many years must this data remain confidential after creation?
Realistic time to discover, refactor, and roll out PQC across your estate.
Conservative estimates place a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer in the early-2030s.
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The Task Force report lays out India's first consolidated strategic roadmap for transitioning the nation's digital infrastructure to quantum-resistant cryptography. It covers all sectors: defence, power, telecom, banking, healthcare, education, and general IT.
The Task Force was constituted under the National Quantum Mission (NQM), approved by the cabinet in April 2023 with a budget of ₹6,003.65 crore (~$700 million) through 2031. The NQM operates through four Thematic Hubs at IISc Bengaluru, IIT Madras with C-DOT, IIT Bombay, and IIT Delhi, collectively involving 152 researchers from 43 institutions across 17 states.
India adopts NIST-selected algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) as the foundation for quantum-safe cryptography. While QKD research continues for specialised applications, PQC is the preferred approach for broad enterprise and government deployments due to its software-based nature and compatibility with existing infrastructure.
A comparative view of published PQC migration timelines by country, with budget allocations and transition targets.
Source: DST Task Force Report (Feb 2026), Section 4.0. The U.S. estimates $7.1 billion for federal PQC migration alone over 2025–2035.
CII (defence, power, telecom, ISRO, DRDO, ONGC) follows an accelerated timeline. Other government and private enterprises follow a standard track.
Lay the foundation encompassing leadership, crypto inventory, Quantum Risk Analysis and prioritisation. Start migration of high-priority systems.
Build quantum-resiliency for high-priority systems and products, institutionalise crypto-agility, and mandate CBOM from vendors.
Achieve full Quantum Resiliency, establish resiliency as the whole-of-enterprise approach, and sustain continuous assurance and continual agility.
Lay the foundation encompassing leadership, crypto inventory, Quantum Risk Analysis and prioritisation. Start migration of high-priority systems.
Build quantum-resiliency for high-priority systems and products, institutionalise crypto-agility, and mandate CBOM from vendors.
Achieve full Quantum Resiliency, establish resiliency as the whole-of-enterprise approach, and sustain continuous assurance and continual agility.
The Task Force defines four priority tiers based on data sensitivity, regulatory exposure, and national security relevance.
CII operators handling data with the longest shelf life and operating systems with the slowest refresh cycles. Both HNDL and TNFL risks are highest. These organisations face existential threats from quantum-capable adversaries.
Enterprises with moderate risk profiles, shorter data sensitivity windows but large attack surfaces. Migration complexity is high due to diverse vendor ecosystems and regulatory requirements.
Supply-side linchpin. Without PQC-ready products from this group, neither urgent nor regular adopters can migrate. CBOM submissions mandatory from FY 2027–28.
Sub-Group I (led by TEC) defines a national risk-based framework for validating PQC products. Higher assurance levels inherit compliance with all lower levels. Certificate validity is risk-aligned, from three years at L1 to ten years at L4.
For low-risk consumer-grade environments. Focus on correct PQC implementation, interoperability, and baseline performance.
Medium-risk handling sensitive data. L2A software security; L2B IT/IoT hardware; L2C operational technology hardware.
High-risk enterprise-grade environments (banking, telecom, healthcare). Long-term security, crypto-agility, enterprise integration.
Very-high-risk sovereign critical infrastructure. Focus on indigenous cryptographic implementations to reduce dependence on external validation ecosystems.
Tier-1 and Tier-2 laboratories to be operational by December 2026. Tier-3 (L3/L4) to be upgraded over 2028–2030 under a Public–Private Partnership model.
For government, industry, and academia to accelerate India's quantum resiliency.
In high-priority systems (banking, finance, government).
To ministries (Railways, Finance, Power) and regulators (SEBI, RBI, CERC).
Tier-1 and Tier-2 labs under TEC/STQC/BIS by Dec 2026.
Mandate compulsory BOM across all government RFPs.
Of indigenously developed quantum-safe products.
Validate through independent testing.
Select labs to sovereign-grade PQC testing facilities.
PQC-ready PKI and capacity building for CISOs and DevOps.
The DST roadmap pairs broad PQC adoption with targeted QKD deployment for strategic links. Global market projections (cited in Section 8.0) underline the dual-track urgency.
projected market by 2030 · MarketsandMarkets, Oct 2025
PQC is the primary mitigation — software-based, internet-scale, drops into TLS/IKE/PKI, and is what KavachQ implements end-to-end.
projected market by 2030 · MarketsandMarkets, Feb 2025
NQM targets inter-city QKD up to 2,000 km over optical fibre and satellite QKD over 2,000 km. KavachQ supports composite PQC–QKD where QKD is deployed.
The report identifies key challenges in post-quantum migration and notes that the framework is advisory. Actual enforcement rests with sectoral regulators. It recommends a coordinated, phased approach supported by vendor enablement, performance engineering, skills development, and independent assurance.
This summary is based on "Implementation of Quantum Safe Ecosystem in India: Report of the Task Force" published by the Department of Science & Technology, Government of India, February 2026. This is a neutral perspective and does not reflect official positions of any government, organisation, or entity.